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Introduction 
Standards of reasonableness play a crucial role in many areas of our legal system, 
including, but not limited to, criminal law, contract law, tort law, and employment law. 
Standards of reasonableness assist fact-finders—either juries or judges—in determining whether 
the conduct under scrutiny is legally acceptable. An example describing how reasonableness may 
factor in determining whether an individual’s actions should be considered criminally negligent 
will help clarify what is meant by standards of reasonableness. Imagine that a man enters an area 
where people often pass through. He decides to shoot his shotgun into the air for fun, but he has 
no intent to harm anyone. While he is shooting his gun, someone walks by and receives a fatal 
bullet wound. The man who shot his gun into the air would be found to have executed legally 
unacceptable behavior because any reasonable person would have known that the action of 
shooting the gun into the air was likely to cause harm to others. He would likely be charged with 
involuntary manslaughter due to his criminally negligent behavior, which is classified as such by 
the concept of reasonableness.  
The specific area of the law that standards of reasonableness operate under determines 
the significance of legal acceptability. For example, under criminal law, a pronouncement of 
acceptability due to the reasonableness of the act will often result in the person who has been 
charged with a crime being found not guilty or being given a reduced punishment because of 
mitigating circumstances after being found guilty. In contract law, acceptability is often used to 
compare the questionable conduct of the actual party to the contract with how a hypothetical, 
reasonable individual would have been expected to act under a contract with identical terms to 
the one being examined by the court. Reasonableness can also factor into legal matters in 
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different ways; for example, it can be used to evaluate a defendant’s actions or to evaluate a 
victim’s perceptions of a defendant’s actions. 
 As there are multiple definitions of reasonableness that are accepted by the courts, the 
concept has generated much debate, some of which is directly related to my thesis, within the 
fields of philosophy of law and legal feminism. Philosophical questions surrounding 
reasonableness standards include those that ask who the reasonable person is and how a 
reasonable person should be described. Is the imaginary reasonable person someone of average 
intelligence? Is the reasonable person someone whose values reflect those held by most 
individuals in a certain community? In this thesis, I will weigh in on the debates surrounding 
reasonableness standards in the following two areas of the law that deal with gender-based harm: 
hostile environment due to workplace sexual harassment, also referred to as workplace sexual 
harassment, and acts of self-defense committed by women who are victims of Intimate Partner 
Violence (IPV), often referred to as battered women.  
In our society, gender plays an immeasurable role in shaping individual lives, 
experiences, and opportunities; thus, it is my contention that justice requires the law to utilize a 
gender-specific, reasonable woman, or reasonable abused-women, standard in cases dealing with 
workplace sexual harassment and in cases in which women who have been abused by their 
spouses for extended periods attack or kill their abusers in non-confrontational settings. By “non-
confrontational settings,” I simply mean any situation in which violence or threats of imminent 
(meaning immediately present) violence is absent. An example of a non-confrontational setting 
could involve someone attacking his or her abuser after being beaten—but not right away in the 
moment of the attack. A gender-specific reasonableness standard in these two areas of the law 
will serve as an acknowledgment of how women experience and respond to harassment and 
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violence, thereby furthering a contextualization of gender inequality in the law, which will 
hopefully provide a theoretical and practical environment that is more conducive to an equal 
situation for women and men. However, it does not follow from these assertions that either the 
unequal position or the differences of perception and lived experience between men and women 
are incapable of transformation. Because these discrepancies and inequities are not fixed aspects 
of reality, it also does not follow that the reasonable woman standard should be a permanent 
legal rule. I view the implementation of the reasonable woman standard in cases of workplace 
sexual harassment and acts of self-defense committed by women who are victims of extensive 
IPV as a temporary move, and once men and women become equally situated in these, and other, 
areas of life, it will be unnecessary.  
In analyzing these two areas that harm women physically and psychologically, I do not 
wish to undermine the experiences and suffering of men who are victims of workplace sexual 
harassment, IPV, or both—either at the hands of men or women. Rather, I wish to focus on 
women because, statistically speaking, women are much more likely to be subject to sexual 
harassment and IPV; according to statistics compiled by Centers for Disease and Control 
Prevention, one in four women and one in nine men have been victims of sexual violence, 
physical aggression, or stalking by an intimate partner (Prevent Domestic Violence in Your 
Community, 2017). The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has found 
that anywhere between 25% to 85% of working women have experienced sexual harassment on 
the job, while 14% to 19% of men have been victims of workplace sexual harassment; however, 
it is important to note that these numbers are not precise because of underreporting (Select Task 
Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace, 2016). In my opinion, this gendered 
disparity is largely, if not entirely, related to historical and current patterns of gender 
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socialization, which have created a context of inequality where women as a group occupy a 
disadvantaged position compared to that of men as a group.  
The thesis will be organized into five sections, followed by a conclusion. Part I will 
explain how reasonableness standards function in workplace sexual harassment law and law 
addressing acts of self-defense committed by women who are victims of IPV. This section will 
also lay out the philosophical issues surrounding the notion of reasonableness in the legal setting. 
Part II will examine how the following three branches of feminist theory understand the two 
issues discussed in this thesis: difference feminism, also known as cultural feminism; dominance 
feminism; and equal treatment feminism; this section will also make assumptions about where 
each branch would end up in the reasonableness dispute. I will ultimately defend a combination 
of difference and dominance theory. Part III will offer an analysis of workplace sexual 
harassment and propose a reasonable woman standard to be applied to these legal cases. Part IV 
will provide an analysis of how IPV and long-term abuse leads to a different context of self-
defense than that offered by traditional self-defense, where two strangers of relatively equal 
strength and size have a physical confrontation. This section will also lay out what a reasonable 
abused-woman standard would look like in cases of self-defense committed in non-
confrontational settings by women who have been victims of IPV. Part V will provide objections 
and responses to my position.  
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I. 
A. Reasonableness in Workplace Sexual Harassment  
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on 
several suspect classes, such as religion, race, and for the purposes of my thesis, sex.1 Largely 
beginning in the 1980s, the courts have expanded the workplace conduct that constitutes 
discrimination based on sex. The EEOC, which is the federal agency in charge of enforcing Title 
VII, defines harassment as follows:  
Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, religion, sex (including 
pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information. 
Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a 
condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to 
create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, 
or abusive (31).  
 
The latter form of sexual harassment (2) describing hostile environment harassment is the 
focus of this thesis, as it presents the most philosophically interesting issues dealing with 
reasonableness standards. Whereas the former form of sexual harassment (1), often labeled quid 
pro quo, deals with tangible and thus often economic harms of discrimination, such as a woman 
being fired for refusing sexual favors, hostile environment is typically less discernible, although 
not necessarily any less injurious than quid pro quo harassment. An example of a hostile 
environment situation could involve a woman who is repeatedly ridiculed, taunted, and put in 
uncomfortable situations, such as being presented with pornographic images, by several 
coworkers and boss, who perceive her as less capable of performing work tasks because of her 
gender. The hostile environment situation is different from quid pro quo in that it alters the work 
atmosphere in a manner that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the victimized individual to 
perform his or her job. As such, hostile environment situations usually involve multiple 
                                                          
1 The law typically does not provide a strong distinction between sex and gender.  
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transgressions, and any one of the defendant’s (or group of defendants) transgressions considered 
by itself does not typically amount to a legally actionable harassment claim. Because our legal 
system was traditionally crafted to sort out direct harms between equally situated individuals, 
discrimination law, especially workplace sexual harassment law, presents unique difficulties for 
fact-finders, for the ubiquitous nature of discrimination results in a context where victims are 
wronged through both an individual injury and a collective injury, resulting from membership in 
an oppressed group—in this case, women. Therefore, discrimination law is complicated because 
of its acknowledgment of, and goals of, providing a solution to historic and current unfair 
treatment of certain groups.  
One major concern surrounding sexual harassment law involves preventing frivolous 
claims of harassment from succeeding in the legal system. Fact-finders must determine whether 
the defendant’s actions are harmful enough to qualify as “intimidating, hostile, or abusive” 
(31)—note that the use of “or” instead of “and” seems to allow for more action to potentially 
create a hostile work environment. Our legal system has adopted a standard of reasonableness, 
which applies to the objective component of a two-pronged objective/subjective standard, most 
clearly described in Harris v. Forklift (1993), that the plaintiff is required to show (Dolkart 1). 
The objective standard of reasonableness ideally blocks unjust outcomes in favor of the plaintiff 
in sexual harassment cases, and I will elaborate on what it involves below.  
 A brief description of the evolution of workplace sexual harassment, which includes a 
description of several landmark court cases, is necessary if one is to grasp the importance of 
reasonableness in this area of the law. Although a vast number of court cases have addressed 
hostile environment and what reasonableness entails, the following four are of considerable 
importance to these issues: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), Rabidue v. Osceola Refining 
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Co. (1986), Ellison v. Brady (1991) and Harris v. Forklift. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time that hostile environment harassment was 
actionable under Title VII as a form of sex discrimination (Newman 534). Before the Meritor 
decision, plaintiffs were required to show that quid pro quo harassment had taken place to file a 
Title VII claim (Newman 534). Meritor signifies a momentous step forward in the path toward 
women’s equality, as it acts as the first meaningful acknowledgment by the courts that hostile 
environment harassment is harmful enough to allow for legal reparation, thereby opening the 
door for a vast number of women to pursue legal claims of workplace harassment that impedes 
their ability to develop to their fullest potential as workers.  
 Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. was decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in 1986, and although the petitioner, Vivienne Rabidue, did not prevail in her claims of 
workplace sexual harassment, Judge Damon Keith’s dissenting opinion is generally viewed as 
the birth of the reasonable woman standard (Newman 535). Ms. Rabidue’s claims were 
evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person (Newman 535). The court asked, “how a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have perceived the [defendant’s] conduct… to 
determine whether Ms. Rabidue had satisfied the burden of proof, meaning that the harassment 
had created a hostile environment and had affected her psychological well-being” (535). In his 
dissention opinion, Judge Keith asserted that the court adopted the incorrect standard to evaluate 
Ms. Rabidue’s claims; Keith argued for the application of a reasonable woman standard instead 
of a reasonable person standard, citing the difference in opinion generally held by men and 
women over what consists of appropriate behavior (535). According to Nicole Newman, “Judge 
Keith warned that unless the outlook of the reasonable woman was adopted, defendants and 
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courts would continue to perpetuate ingrained notions of reasonable behavior defined by the 
offenders—in most cases, men” (536).  
Judge Keith’s dissent offered a previously unheard-of option for future judges to adopt: a 
gender-specific standard of reasonableness, which prioritizes the lived experience of women in 
the workplace, an area largely dominated by men in terms of positions of power, compensation 
for work, and numbers of workers, while simultaneously recognizing that reasonable person 
standards used by the courts may be biased against women. Further, his dissent galvanized the 
academic debate over two issues. First, whether utilization of a reasonable woman standard will 
result in more just outcomes for women workers. And, second, whether it is fair to hold 
defendants (often men) to a standard that by definition reflects the perceptions of women.   
 In Ellison v. Brady, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the 
reasonable woman standard for the first time to determine “whether conduct is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a hostile working environment,” and found for petitioner, Kerry 
Ellison, marking the end of the use of the reasonable person standard in workplace sexual 
harassment cases in the Ninth Circuit (Westman 813). One of the most important implications of 
the Ellison decision is that it sends the message that women’s insights should be seriously 
considered when dealing with workplace sexual harassment, a gender-based harm that 
predominately affects women. Further, the Ninth Circuit Court seemingly takes the position that 
it is possible for fact-finders, whether juries or judges (the latter of whom are more often male), 
to comprehend and apply the perspective of a reasonable woman. Finally, Ellison set a precedent 
that other federal courts may choose to follow, that is, unless the U.S. Supreme Court takes a 
position regarding the suitability of the reasonable woman standard. However, only some circuit 
courts have chosen to adopt the reasonable woman standard, and the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
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elected to take an explicit position on the issue (Newman 537). That said, it is possible that one 
could interpret the combination of the fact that the Court has neglected to take an explicit stance 
on the issue and the language in the Supreme Court’s written opinions in Harris and Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) to suggest its implicit acceptance of the reasonable 
woman standard (537). Ultimately, though, the Supreme Court’s explicit or implicit endorsement 
of the reasonable woman standard is not required to defend it as a legal solution (in a normative 
sense) in workplace sexual harassment, due to its potential to create a more just situation 
between men and women.  
 Finally, Harris v. Forklift is a landmark Supreme Court case that, as stated earlier, most 
clearly lays out how reasonableness standards currently factor into workplace sexual harassment 
law. However, the Court originally granted certiorari on the issue of whether evidence of serious 
psychological harm is required to find liability in Title VII workplace sexual harassment cases, 
and it determined that it is not (Dolkart 1). But because of uncertainty among lower courts, the 
Court attempted to clarify the test for establishing that conduct is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute sexual harassment” (Dolkart 1). As Dolkart notes, quoting from Harris, 
“the Court adopted a dual objective/subjective standard, holding that harassing conduct must be 
sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,’ and that 
the victim must ‘subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive’” (1). Thus, it is necessary 
but insufficient for plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases to show that they were harmed by the 
behavior in question (the subjective component). Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the 
examined behavior would have harmed a similarly situated reasonable person (the objective 
component).  
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The focus of this thesis is on what Dolkart and others label the “objective standard”: how 
are fact-finders and the public to make sense of what kind of behavior a reasonable person, or in 
some cases, a reasonable woman, would find objectionable enough to be considered “hostile or 
abusive?” Further if it is the case, as proponents of the reasonable woman standard propose, that 
men and women often react differently to behaviors that are sexual in nature, how is one to make 
sense of the hypothetical responses of a reasonable genderless person, as suggested by the 
reasonable person standard? The Harris decision provides a small amount of guidance through 
its requirement that “the context of the totality of the circumstances in the workplace” is to be 
considered (Dolkart 20). The “totality of the circumstances” requirement indicates that fact-
finders are to conceive of a reasonable person who understands the workplace environment as a 
dynamic context, rather than evaluating the conduct in question as taking place in a vacuum, or 
as a random injury. Further, it is possible for the “totality of the circumstances” requirement to 
be interpreted as involving consideration of how one’s gender, and in the case of women, their 
unequal position in society, may affect how certain treatment stemming from this societal 
inequality should be evaluated in the workplace. Thus, the Harris decision may be interpreted as 
offering implicit acceptance of a gender-specific reasonableness standard. The Harris court had 
the opportunity to comment on the reasonable person versus the reasonable woman debate, but it 
chose not to, leaving the lower courts and academic scholars to make sense of the debate.  
B. Reasonableness in Self-Defense Law 
 Reasonableness in the law regarding acts of self-defense committed in non-
confrontational settings by women who have been victims of long-term IPV plays a different role 
than it does in the sexual harassment described above. In the type of self-defense described in 
this thesis, standards of reasonableness are used to evaluate the actions of the woman perpetrator, 
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who has committed act(s) of violence against her abuser. Evaluating actions in these cases 
involves examining two identities, namely offender and victim, which seem prima facie 
conflicting. Yet upon closer examination, these two identities are connected, as understanding a 
woman’s status as a perpetrator in these cases is futile without also having a comprehension of 
her experiences as a victim of horrific abuse, and the effects this abuse has had on her physical 
and psychological states, including her beliefs about the possibilities available to her. For 
example, a victim of domestic violence may believe that she is unable to escape the violent 
relationship—even if this belief is not objectively true. Put succinctly, a reasonable woman 
standard may be used in these cases to help fact-finders determine what amounts to a sufficient 
basis for an abused woman to be either justified or excused (an important distinction that I will 
elaborate on later) in attacking her abuser. The courts may accept that the woman uses deadly 
force in a non-confrontational moment because she reasonably believes that doing so is the only 
way to save her life.  
To facilitate a more thorough understanding of how reasonableness factors into self-
defense law, I will explain the following: first, the traditional view of self-defense adopted by the 
courts, including a brief discussion on justification and excuse; second, objections to traditional 
self-defense in terms of its possible inability to account for the reality of women who act in self-
defense, and how these objections relate to the subjective versus objective debate regarding how 
to properly evaluate a defendant’s actions; and finally, how taking the subjective position allows 
for the development of a standard of reasonableness that can assist fact-finders in assessing acts 
of violence committed by abused women in the rare event that they use deadly force against their 
abuser.  
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A fundamental goal of our legal system is to discourage the use of violence as a form of 
self-help; this goal stems from our desire to protect individual lives. As well-stated by Catheryn 
Jo Rosen, “The law’s prohibition against intentional killing coincides with contemporary 
society’s emphasis on the importance of human life as the most valuable interest protected by the 
criminal law” (512). Our legal system has good reason for wanting to prevent members of the 
public from inflicting unnecessary harm, as from a utilitarian standpoint, whereby actions are 
evaluated based on outcomes, encouraging such behavior would likely result in disastrous 
outcomes, such as an overall increase in societal violence. However, in limited circumstances, 
our legal system generally tolerates, to a widely varying level, the actions of an individual who 
attacks another with the intent to kill. One of such circumstances is the law of self-defense, 
where victims of an attack who have used force to protect themselves may claim self-defense as 
an affirmative defense to a homicide charge.  
In “On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers,” Richard Rosen 
lays out the three fundamental principles of self-defense that are generally accepted by the 
courts: proportionality, fault, and necessity (378). Rosen notes that “While different jurisdictions 
employ different rules to govern the defense, in every jurisdiction the rules used embody one of 
the three principles, or are a product of a balancing of these principles” (378). The condition of 
proportionality asks that the defensive force being used be no greater than the force used by the 
attacker (Rosen 379). For example, if an attacker is about to shoot a victim with a gun, the victim 
is generally allowed to also use a gun in self-defense against the attacker. By fault, Rosen means 
that the individual claiming self-defense cannot be the aggressor in the altercation being legally 
examined (379). And finally, “Both imminence and, when used, retreat, [which] require[s] that 
under some circumstances the actor must retreat if it is possible to do so in safety, are included to 
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ensure that the defensive force is truly necessary” (Rosen 379). Imminence is most often 
understood to entail immediate threats to one’s life. These seemingly narrow requirements reflect 
the law’s reluctance to allow self-help in the form of putting individual lives at risk. That said, it 
is important to note that the actual existence of these three perquisites is not necessary in cases 
where a reasonable person, or reasonable abused-woman, sensibly believes that these conditions 
exist. If the jury finds the defendant’s belief to be reasonable, even if incorrect, she may be found 
to not be blameworthy for her actions, and thereby she may be absolved of the homicide charge.  
There are two possibilities for conceptualizing the finding that a defendant is not 
culpable, and thus able to succeed by means of a plea of self-defense: the defendant is viewed as 
either excused or justified in his or her actions.2 Most jurisdictions consider self-defense as a 
justification, and Catheryn Jo Rosen describes it as such: “Justification defenses identify 
objectively determinable external circumstances that render otherwise criminal acts acceptable to 
society…The law assumes that, when circumstances that define the justification exist, the 
defendant has accomplished a socially desirable objective by committing the act or, at least, has 
not harmed society” (18-19). It follows that if one were to take the position that self-defense is 
justified, taking this position would necessarily involve labeling those who act in self-defense as 
acting correctly from an objective standpoint. Thus, if others were to find themselves in a similar 
situation, they too would be correct in acting in using lethal force to fend off an attacker (Rosen 
18). Under the justification theory, self-defense is correct because one life is more valuable than 
another, or because of some positive outcome it produces in society—and Catheryn Jo Rosen is 
correct in arguing that both claims are strong and difficult to defend (512-513). The other, and 
what I view as the weaker, option of labeling self-defense as an excuse involves “[focusing] on 
                                                          
2 Justification and excuse are different than mitigating circumstances. Whereas justification and excuse are pre-
sentencing determinations, mitigating factors usually affect the sentencing process.  
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the actor’s subjective perceptions…An excused actor has committed a harmful act that the 
criminal law seeks to prevent…the excused act did not avoid a greater societal harm or further a 
greater societal interest. The actor is excused despite the harmful act because, due to internal or 
external pressure, she was not morally blameworthy” (Rosen 22). Thus, excusing an individual 
who acted in self-defense does not compel us to say that said individual made the objectively 
correct choice.  
Both justification and excuse theories of self-defense allow us to avoid convicting 
individuals, including abused women who kill in self-defense, from being convicted of a crime. 
However, some feminist philosophers, such as Phyllis Crocker, argue that abused women’s acts 
of self-defense must be justified rather than excused, as such a classification is the only way to 
defend these women as acting as reasonably as men who act in self-defense, through its apparent 
avoidance of the stigma that these women are by definition unreasonable (Crocker 131). Crocker 
and those who also take this position appear to assume that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
label self-defense as an excuse and hold that those who act in self-defense act reasonably under 
the situation they find themselves in. I do not believe that taking the excuse approach forces us to 
say that abused women who act in self-defense act unreasonably; rather abused women’s actions 
may be consider reasonable in light of their status as victims. I argue that an excuse defense is 
the only way to seriously defend the use of a reasonable woman standard in cases of abused 
women who attack their batterers, as it would be absurd to claim that these women are justified, 
and thus that anyone, i.e. possibly someone who has not been trapped in an abusive household, 
would also be justified in protecting themselves by force. Under a characterization of self-
defense as an excuse, it can be said that abused women are not as free to make decisions and act 
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as those who are not in an abusive household; therefore, although their acts of violence are 
harmful, they should not be found blameworthy if sufficient evidence is presented to fact-finders.   
 The traditional notion of self-defense, which entails the three principles of 
proportionality, fault, and necessity as described above, has generated much debate among those 
who wish to include abused women in the self-defense paradigm. The debate centers around 
making sense of women who kill and how they do so under very different circumstances than 
men. For example, women who attack their abusers are often smaller and less physically capable 
than their male counterparts (Rosen 510). Also, these women are acting with a familiarity of 
their partner’s patterns of violence (Rosen 510). These two realities factor into abused women’s 
perception of danger by often making imminent danger appear more likely than it would to a 
woman who has not been abused or to a man. Cathryn Jo Rosen draws attention to the 
complexities involved in including abused women in the traditional self-defense model, “Rules 
requiring like force, imminency, consideration of only the circumstances surrounding the killing, 
and the use of an objective reasonable man standard necessarily defeat the woman’s claim” 
(509).3 Taking note of these difficulties could cause one to assert that an entirely new conception 
of self-defense theory, where the core principles described above are discarded, or maybe even 
something else entirely, is required to enable abused women to have a legitimate chance at being 
excused (or justified) from their violent acts. I disagree with the belief that there is no place for 
abused women who kill in the traditional self-defense paradigm. If the generally accepted 
principles of self-defense are loosened, self-defense, as currently accepted by the courts, can 
provide justice for women who, given the horrific conditions they exist in, act out violently 
                                                          
3 To give context, the reasonable man standard was the default position until feminists rejected it 
as biased, leading to the development of the reasonable person standard. 
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against their abusers. I will expand upon this argument in Part IV, where I will lay out what a 
standard of reasonableness to judge the actions of an abused woman should look like.   
 Whether the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions should be measured by a 
subjective or an objective standard is a point of contention among the courts. This objective-
subjective debate is also of critical importance to the concerns of fitting abused women who 
attack their abusive partners into the traditional self-defense model that is accepted by the courts. 
The objective standard asks the jury to consider whether the facts and situation of the case would 
have led a hypothetical reasonable person to act in self-defense (Kultgen 843). In contrast, 
“Under the subjective standard, the jury need not decide what a [nongendered] reasonable person 
would believe, but rather what the defendant reasonably believed” (Kultgen 844).4 Taking the 
subjective approach allows the jury to take “the unique physical and psychological 
characteristics of the accused into account” (State v. Leidholm 507). Further, taking the 
subjective approach allows for the possible admittance of expert testimony from psychologists or 
doctors to further the jury’s understanding of the defendant’s physical and psychological state. 
An example of testimony that often accompanies cases dealing with self-defense of abused 
women is the battered women’s syndrome. The battered women’s syndrome was originally 
developed by Dr. Lenore Walker, who argues that domestic violence has a cyclical nature and 
can produce predictable responses in women suffering from the syndrome (Kultgen 839). 
However, the battered woman syndrome theory is by no means the only expert testimony that 
should be admissible in court. There is an extensive amount of credible psychological findings 
that can be used to assist juries in understanding the realities and experiences of victims of IPV 
                                                          
4 I understand Kultgen to mean in that sort of person’s position, not literally that person.  
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(Teays 74). Expert testimony can help juries make sense of how a reasonable woman in a similar 
position as the defendant would have acted.  
If one grants my position that it would be morally wrong to convict some abused women 
who kill in non-confrontational settings, the subjective position must be taken, as it seems 
unlikely that these women’s self-defense claims could prevail by means of the objective 
standard. Use of the objective standard to admit the self-defense pleas of abused women would 
demand us to accept that the hypothetical reasonable person, i.e. someone who has not been a 
victim of long-term abuse, would be justified or excused in attacking someone in a non-
confrontational setting—a claim we obviously want to avoid making (Rosen 511). Women who 
are victims of IPV must be judged as different from those without similar experiences precisely 
because their social realities cause them to interpret danger differently than men or women who 
have not been repeatedly abused (Rosen 511). Consequently, I believe that the only way to 
seriously defend a reasonable woman standard in these self-defense cases is to apply the 
subjective standard to assist in assessments of reasonableness of conduct.  
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II. 
A. Feminist Theory  
 Feminist legal theorists have effectuated change in standards of reasonableness. 
Feminists are responsible for the shift from the reasonable man standard to the reasonable person 
standard; they challenged the reasonable man standard on the grounds that it assigns the 
universal point of reference to men and that it eliminates the possibility of women as reasonable 
(Cahn 1404). Feminists have also challenged the allegedly objective and neutral reasonable 
person by arguing that in practice, the reasonable person is identical to the reasonable man, as it 
contains “unstated assumptions that are actually gendered” (Cahn 1405). By definition, all 
feminists believe that men and women should have political, social, and economic equality, but 
feminists disagree about what it means to be equal and how to achieve equality (Levit et al. 161). 
The three feminist theories that I will discuss as they relate to this thesis are cultural feminism, 
also known as difference theory; dominance theory; and equal treatment theory, which offers an 
objection to the first two theories. A discussion of these theories provides a theoretical 
foundation to assist in the conceptualization of the reasonable woman standard in sexual 
harassment and self-defense law. Ultimately, I will argue that the best approach to take in regard 
to the two issues discussed in my thesis is a combination of cultural feminism, where I assert that 
differences, although many are social in nature, do exist, and dominance theory, which supports 
my claim that sexual harassment and IPV can both be understood through a lens of widespread 
unequal power relations between men and women in our society.  
B. Cultural Feminism (Difference Theory) 
 Broadly speaking, cultural feminism, which I will use interchangeably with “difference 
theory,” holds that there are differences between men and women and that there are 
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commonalities between most women. Further, “Cultural feminism argues that formal equality 
does not always result in substantive equality. Gender-neutral laws can keep women down if 
they do not acknowledge women’s different experiences and perspectives” (Levit et al. 162). I 
understand formal equality to mean equality that is codified into law. An example of a law that is 
prima facie gender neutral, but that in practice puts women at a disadvantage is a law that 
requires all persons applying for a job to be a certain height, say 5 feet 10 inches; on its face this 
law supports formal equality between men and women, but in practice it would prevent most 
women from applying for the job; consequently, this law would not ensure substantive equality 
between the genders. Difference feminists would criticize this law because of its unfair outcome 
of limiting the possibilities available to women workers. Proponents of difference theory may 
recognize biological or social differences between men and women or a combination of the two. 
Because cultural feminism believes that there are pertinent differences between men and women, 
it holds that women should not be required to conform to male norms to be guaranteed fair 
treatment (Levit et al. 162).  
One can sensibly believe that cultural feminism supports the reasonable woman standard. 
Underneath the difference theory, we can question supposed objectivity in the law. The 
reasonable person is a type of objective standard in the law that cultural feminists would likely 
criticize due to its pronouncement of one universal standard of rationality that any fact-finder can 
adopt to evaluate legal scenarios. Cahn argues that difference feminists criticize the reasonable 
person standard because only the language changes (from man to person), while the content 
remains the same, i.e., the standard still evaluates reasonableness from the perspective of an 
upper-middle class white male (1413). From the standpoint of difference feminism, a genderless 
reasonable person is incomprehensible because there are significant differences between men 
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and women that the law should recognize. Cultural feminists would also reject the reasonable 
person standard because it inevitably suppresses group differences as irrelevant. The suppression 
of group differences is especially questionable in anti-discrimination law, which is supposed to 
make reparations for harms that occur because of one’s membership in a group. The difference 
theory also questions the assumption that legal processes and outcomes are most just when 
differences that shape individual lives are excluded from the dialogue by means of the reasonable 
person standard. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young claims that, “The 
liberal imperative that differences should make no difference puts a sanction of silence on those 
things which at the level of practical consciousness people ‘know’ about the significance of 
group differences” (165). Under the guise of objectivity, the reasonable person standard arguably 
trivializes the experiences of minority groups, such as women, by sending the message that the 
challenges they face because of membership in their respective groups can be adequately 
understood using the ambiguous reasonable person.   
I believe that cultural feminism offers support for the use of a reasonable woman standard 
in workplace sexual harassment law. Under this theory, the reasonable woman standard would be 
beneficial in evaluating reasonableness in workplace sexual harassment for two connected 
reasons. First, since women are relative newcomers in the U.S. workforce, especially in certain 
fields like medicine and construction, women in these fields operate in a context that has been 
shaped, and continues to be predominately controlled by, men. Because of the context of the 
workplace in our society, working women are not similarly situated to men. There are real 
differences that stem from this historic and current male-centered workplace; these differences 
take form in barriers to women’s success in the work sphere. One significant barrier is that 
women are more likely to be physically and verbally harassed on the job than men. As cited in 
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the introduction, there is a 25% to 85% chance that working women will be harassed during their 
lifetime (Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace, 2016). Because of the 
prevalence of workplace harassment, and other forms of violence against women in our society, 
it comes as no surprise that women fear being harassed, and reasonably so. This leads to my 
second point. Women are often more likely than men to perceive conduct as hostile or 
intimidating (Shoenfelt et al. 648). Thus, it is more likely that physical or verbal forms of 
behavior will negatively affect working women; for example, women who have been subjected 
to harassment may be in a constant state of fear while at work, which may result in them being 
less productive and may eventually result in penalties such as being fired from their jobs. 
According to the cultural feminism viewpoint, Shoenfelt et al.’s findings mark a pertinent 
difference that the law should acknowledge to help level the playing field between men and 
women. Accommodating women’s perspective by means of the reasonable woman standard is 
one way that the law may acknowledge these gender differences.   
Cultural feminism also provides theoretical support for use of the reasonable woman 
standard in the law regarding acts of self-defense committed by women who are victims of IPV 
in non-confrontational settings. Under a difference theory approach, it makes sense to draw 
attention to the statistical findings that one in four women are at risk of being abused by their 
spouse during their lifetime (Prevent Domestic Violence in Your Community, 2017). Similarly, 
to the sexual harassment analysis above, assumptions can be drawn from these statistics. It is 
reasonable for women in abusive relationships with men to fear for their well-being, especially 
because their male spouses are typically larger, and thus more capable of inflicting serious bodily 
harm. I consider it reasonable for these women to believe that they would not be able to protect 
themselves in the event of an altercation with their spouse. Also, cultural feminism calls attention 
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to the typical differences between men and women in acts of self-defense. Psychological findings 
such as the battered women syndrome demonstrate that physical and psychological harm 
sometimes results in “learned helplessness” in abused women that may cause them to believe 
self-defense is necessary to save their lives, even in cases where someone without the experience 
of abuse would not feel the need to act in self-defense (Kultgen 839). Long-term abuse produces 
changes in perceptions of danger in the victim, which cultural feminists would argue is a 
difference that the law should take into consideration.  
Finally, cultural feminists would support the reasonable woman standard in cases of non-
confrontational self-defense because they would want to take the environment that many of these 
women live in into consideration. Women in abusive relationships often have a difficult time 
leaving their spouses due to many reasons. Kultgen lists the following factors that may affect an 
abused woman’s belief that she is free to leave her abuser: economic dependence on her spouse, 
children living in the abusive home, and fear that the abusive spouse would find and kill her and 
her children if she attempted to leave (841). Proponents of cultural feminism, myself included, 
would note that this environment is one that not as many men find themselves in, suggesting 
another pertinent difference that the law should realize and act on through the implementation of 
a reasonable woman standard.  
C. Equal Treatment Theory 
 Equal treatment feminism applies the ideals of traditional liberalism and, as such, is quite 
distinct from and acts as pushback against the other two theories discussed here. It is based on 
the standard of formal equality, which is primarily concerned with “equal citizenship, equal 
opportunities in the public arena, individualism, and rationality” (Levit et al. 161). Proponents of 
equal treatment theory attempt to achieve equal standing between men and women by means of 
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focusing on similarities between the two genders. As stated by Levit et al., “The equal treatment 
principles were simple: the law should not treat a woman differently than a similarly situated 
man. Also, the law should not base decisions about individual women on generalizations (even 
statistically accurate ones) about women as a group” (161). Proponents of equal treatment theory 
believe it to be an appealing approach to sex inequality because it challenges the notion that 
“natural” differences, i.e. stereotypes about women, warrant divergent treatment under the law 
(161). I admit that in some areas, such as in terms of educational opportunities, where women’s 
equality was advanced through arguments asserting that there are no relevant differences 
between men and women that would preclude women from achieving in an educational setting, 
this theory can produce positive outcomes.  
Equal treatment theory, however, seems unsuited to tackle the situations, such as those 
described in this thesis, or pregnancy, for example, where women are not equally situated to 
men. The assumption that women and other minority groups must prove that they are similarly 
situated to men to receive fair treatment and a full recognition of their humanity seems wrong. 
Why should the burden of proof be placed upon women to prove that they are similarly situated? 
Also, who gets to determine what it means to be similarly situated and decide who meets the 
qualifications? It seems that the decider of such issues would presumably be men. I believe that 
equal treatment fails to provide a solution to issues like domestic violence and workplace sexual 
harassment; because equal treatment theory leaves out analysis of power structures in society, it 
seems to interpret issues such as workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence as random 
instances of violence and harm, rather than as harms occurring through a broader pattern—
something dominance and difference theories can explain. Understanding these issues as random 
occurrences of violence does an injustice to men and women alike.  
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 Equal treatment theory strongly rejects the reasonable woman standard, as it goes against 
the theory’s fundamental belief that giving women particular treatment will not advance equality 
between men and women. Cahn argues that, “Sameness feminism suggests that the reasonable 
woman standard is too limiting. Such a standard perpetuates distinctions between men and 
women, rather than developing a standard applicable to both sexes” (Cahn 1412). Advocates of 
equal treatment theory would believe that a gender-specific standard of reasonableness would 
propagate negative stereotypes about women, such as the belief that women only need special 
protection in the form of their own standard of reasonableness because they are weak and 
incapable of defending themselves otherwise. While I believe that the perpetuation of negative 
stereotypes by means of a reasonable woman standard is certainly a possibility, I also argue that 
we can ideally prevent this from occurring by ensuring that a diverse group of women is 
involved in the formulation of a gender-specific standard and that fact-finders are given careful 
instructions on how to apply the standard so that the chance of this negative outcome occurring is 
reduced. 
D. Dominance Theory 
 Dominance theory takes a more radical approach than cultural feminism and equal 
treatment feminism in explaining social, political, and economic inequalities between men and 
women. Dominance theory is largely attributed to Catharine MacKinnon, and its central premise 
is that, “the inequalities women experience as sex discrimination in the economic, political, and 
familial arenas result from patters of male domination” (Levit et al. 164). As Levit et al. notes, 
quoting from Robin West’s Jurisprudence and Gender, male domination is reinforced by “a 
political structure that values men more than women” (165). Under the dominance theory 
approach, equal treatment theory and cultural feminism are problematic because neither bring 
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sufficient attention to the structures and institutions in society that perpetuate the patriarchy, or 
the systematic rule by men. The patriarchy is reinforced by a set of societal structures; one 
example is religion, which has often been utilized to defend the claim that women’s role is to 
serve men. The patriarchy provides a context that allows for and perpetuates individual harms 
against women. Further, dominance theory takes issue with equal treatment theory and cultural 
feminism because they judge women either by their correspondence with men, which manifests 
through similar characteristics, or a lack of correspondence with men (Levit et al. 164). Equal 
treatment theory and cultural feminism assume that men signify the norm, thereby justifying the 
assignment of the general point of reference to men. On the other hand, dominance theory would 
call for women to define their own norm, or point of reference, that is free from the prescriptions 
of a system that believes men are superior.  
Dominance theory departs from the equal treatment and difference approaches in that its 
primary goal is emancipation from men; whereas the main goal of the other two approaches is to 
achieve equivalence between men and women (Levit et al. 164). Cahn argues that “Catharine 
MacKinnon rejects both sameness [equal treatment theory] and difference [cultural feminism], 
arguing that these theories do not address the experiences of women who live under the 
conditions of sex inequality” (Cahn 1411). MacKinnon calls for attention to the voices of women 
who describe their experiences of subordination, which manifests in housework, sexuality, the 
workplace, domestic abuse, etc., through a process she labels as “consciousness raising;” she 
believes that doing so is an effective way for women to be liberated form men (Levit et al. 165). 
Under dominance theory, we can label workplace sexual harassment and IPV as forms of 
violence against women that are perpetuated by structures such as the workplace and sexuality. 
In the workplace, victims of sexual harassment are dominated by men who, for example, use 
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economic status and power to sexually exploit women. On the other hand, dominance theorists 
understand IPV, which sometimes leads to cases of non-confrontational acts of self-defense, as 
violence against women in its highest form (Levit et al. 164). Furthermore, dominance theorists 
argue that our legal system does little to improve women’s lives because it is deeply entrenched 
with male biases (MacKinnon 1294). For example, our legal system harms women even further 
when it imposes mild sentences on perpetrators of sexual violence (Levit et al. 164). Thus, 
dominance theory holds that sex discrimination and inequality have deeper roots than the other 
two branches believe to be the case, and therefore that practices based on the theories given by 
the other two branches will not be as effective as those prescribed by dominance theory. 
It is not as obvious where dominance theory would fall on the reasonable person versus 
reasonable woman debate, and it is possible that it would call for something more radical, such 
as throwing out reasonableness altogether. The notion of reasonableness could be considered too 
entrenched with male norms to be workable. However, I do not believe that the more radical 
approach is necessarily the case, and I will argue for an interpretation of dominance theory that 
promotes the reasonable woman standard. For example, MacKinnon’s notion of “consciousness 
raising” fits nicely with the reasonable women standard. If the standard is formulated correctly, 
i.e., by women themselves and not by men attempting to speak for women, the reasonable 
women standard is powerful because it presents an opportunity for women to speak up about 
their oppression in the home and in society and to reformulate an important aspect of our legal 
system (standards of reasonableness) to better align with women’s experiences. Also, 
encouraging women to speak up about forms of violence against them and using this dialogue to 
craft a new standard of reasonableness undermines the notion that what goes on in the home and 
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in sexual relationships is private in nature, and thus belongs outside of the realm of what the 
government and the law should deal with.  
E. Combining Cultural Feminism and Dominance Theory to Make Sense of Workplace Sexual 
Harassment and Acts of Self-Defense by Victims of IPV 
 Many of the disagreements between the three branches of feminist theory discussed in 
this thesis ultimately come down to what is labeled as the sameness-difference debate. Martha 
Minow articulates the sameness-difference debate as follow: “When does treating people 
differently emphasize their differences and stigmatize or hinder them on that basis? And when 
does treating people the same become insensitive to their differences and likely to stigmatize or 
hinder them on that basis?” (404). It is difficult to predict the answers to Minow’s questions, but 
I believe that in the law of workplace sexual harassment and self-defense of IPV victims who 
attack their abusers, at least currently, acknowledgment of difference through the reasonable 
woman standard will result in a more just outcome. However, acknowledgement of differences 
by means of the reasonable woman standard will only lead to more fairness between men and 
women if the current differences are not understood as essential—which means natural and 
permanent. Gender and gender roles are malleable and thus subject to change. There is nothing 
inherent in men that causes them to be more likely to abuse their partners, or more likely to hold 
positions of economic and social power in the workplace. Ideally, more widespread use of the 
reasonable woman standard in in these cases will offer a new perspective to our judicial system 
that will promote an admission of the power gender roles have over individuals in our society 
and a desire to alter the roles to advance equality between men and women.  
I argue that combining cultural feminism with dominance theory allows us to say that the 
differences between men and women, although real in the sense that they shape experiences, are 
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not necessary in the sense that gender and the gender roles that society prescribes are not 
determined by an individual’s sex. For example, one prominent gender role often prescribed to 
women is that they should be caring individuals and take care of their family. Mackinnon 
describes women’s belief that they must be caring to be valued in society as “false 
consciousness,” she states that, “women value care because men have valued us according to the 
care we give them… Women think in relational terms because our existence is defined in 
relation to men” (Levit et al. 165). This plays out in sexual harassment and domestic violence; 
men place demands on women to be caring and women feel that the only way to succeed in 
either the workplace or in a relationship is to be caring, perhaps to such an extent that the caring 
involves a harmful sort of self-sacrifice. A reasonable woman standard may take these pressures 
into account to help make sense of women’s responses, such as reluctance to report due to fear of 
retaliation or shaming, to sexual harassment and domestic abuse. Through a combination of 
difference and dominance theories, we can assert that patterns of responses among women stem 
from unequal power relations that do not need to be in place, while also saying that the power 
imbalance creates a situation in which differences are produced that may need to be 
acknowledged through legal means.   
Taking a difference and gender subordination approach facilitates the defense of a more 
subjective standard of reasonableness. However, there are several important objections to such 
an approach as the theoretical foundation for a reasonable woman standard that need be 
answered for. A popular criticism of dominance theory is that the MacKinnon’s idea of “false 
consciousness” suggests that women cannot make free choices, making it demeaning (Levit et al. 
165). While “false consciousness” may be interpreted in a way that makes it seem 
condescending, I think it makes more sense to interpret it as a notion that allows women and men 
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to question gendered societal assumptions, such as those surrounding gender roles, which are 
commonly taught and taken as given. Once gendered beliefs are examined, both men and women 
will be freer in making decisions on how to act. There is nothing inherent in MacKinnon’s ideas 
of “false consciousness” and “consciousness raising” that forces us to criticize women who 
choose to subscribe to more traditional gender roles, such as making the choice to not work 
outside the home—rather, dominance theory undermines the belief that women belong in the 
home, or private sphere, rather than the public sphere.  
A common critique of cultural feminists (and the gender-specific reasonableness standard 
they support) is that they “characterize women as needing special protection” (Levit et al. 163). I 
do not believe “special protection” is necessarily a bad thing, as long as this protection does not 
end up putting women at a disadvantage by restricting them, and if this approach is used only 
while women are at an unequal position in society overall. It is certainly possible that women 
benefit from protection in some cases, such as sexual harassment and acts of non-traditional self-
defense. The protection given by a more widespread use of reasonable woman standard could 
help women achieve more equal footing with men, as it did in Ellison v. Brady. That said, I wish 
to avoid using the word “special,” as it implies undeserved or unwarranted, and I do not think 
this is the case. Why should we think that treating women and men differently in some cases is 
automatically unjust? Minow argues that, “Buried in the questions about difference are 
assumptions that difference is linked to stigma or deviance and that sameness is a prerequisite for 
equality. Perhaps these assumptions themselves must be identified and assessed if we are to 
escape or transcend the dilemmas of difference” (405). Once we examine and question popular 
assumptions, such as that different treatment cannot be fair, the reasonable woman standard 
stands as a more feasible option. If formulated and executed correctly, the reasonable woman 
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standard, and the different treatment it affords men and women, may be considered fairer than 
the use of one genderless reasonable person standard for men and women.  
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III. 
The Reasonable Woman in Workplace Sexual Harassment Cases: What would she look like?  
Gender differences matter when evaluating workplace sexual harassment, both in terms 
of the total number of occurrences of harassment and in analyzing how the conduct in question 
may be perceived as harassing. Further, gender differences must be considered when examining 
how workplace sexual harassment affects individuals in the long-term, including the possibilities 
open to them in the future. In Catharine MacKinnon’s Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 
she first argued that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, and thus her work acted 
as a catalyst for immense change in our legal atmosphere, specifically in Title VII law. 
MacKinnon connects women’s economic subordination and sexual subordination as follows:  
Work is critical to women’s survival and independence. Sexual harassment exemplifies 
and promotes employment practices which disadvantage women in work (especially 
occupational segregation) and sexual practices which intimately degrade and objectify 
women. In this broader perspective, sexual harassment at work undercuts woman’s 
potential for social equality in two ways: by using her employment position to coerce her 
sexually, while using her sexual position to coerce her economically (MacKinnon 7). 
 
Thus, for MacKinnon, women will not be liberated from men until they are free economically 
and sexually—the two are inextricable. Even though women’s position in our society has 
improved since MacKinnon published her piece on workplace sexual harassment in 1979, there 
is still a long way to go if women are to achieve equality with men. I believe that workplace 
sexual harassment can still be described as linking sexual and economic subordination; sexual 
subordination facilitates economic subordinate and vice versa.  
According to Levit et al., the employment sphere can be considered a form of violence 
against women: “gendered division of labor occurs whereby women are segregated into inferior-
status jobs at lower wages” (Levit et al. 164). Because of the gendered division of labor, and the 
fact that women are not equally compensated for their work, women, as a group, are more likely 
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to be exploited by those they work with (or under) through sexual harassment (there are 
exceptions, of course). Since women typically occupy positions of little power, it is often more 
difficult for them to speak out, for if they choose to speak out, repercussions that doubly harm 
victims of harassment, such as firing, are possible. Further, women’s occupation of positions of 
little power may cause others to be more likely to discredit what they say when they do speak 
out; a common stereotype is that the complainant is lying, or exaggerating, her claims to win 
money. Consequently, fact-finders may view plaintiffs as untrustworthy, potentially reducing the 
likelihood of plaintiffs winning in legal battles. The notion of a hypothetical reasonable person 
standard exasperates the difficulties for victims of sexual harassment who choose the legal route.  
Our legal tradition has prioritized neutral stances for evaluative purposes: “The ideal 
evaluator is supposed to be separated and uninvolved. Yet the dispassionate, uninvolved, remote 
stance is, on the contrary, the worst possible evaluative stance. For it is impossible for one who 
assumes this stance to take seriously what it is like to be victimized and oppressed” (Peterson 
154). Linda Peterson adds, “Imagine, for example, that you have no gender, nor any sexual 
characteristics whatsoever. Now try to determine what it would be like to be fondled, pinched, 
grabbed, called a “whore,” a “bitch,” etc.,” (154). If discrimination law, specifically Title VII, is 
to achieve its goals of changing society through the elimination of formal and concealed barriers 
to equality, it must take the stance of those groups who have historically been and continue to be 
discriminated against and marginalized. Bonnie Westman asserts that, “Title VII presents an 
opportunity to redress the imbalance of control in the workplace…By defining sexual harassment 
as any conduct which a reasonable woman finds hostile or offensive, a woman's opinion will 
carry equal weight. The reasonable woman standard… allows women to participate in the 
workplace on an equal footing with men” (825).  Furthermore, and perhaps even more 
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problematically, “the ideal of impartiality serves ideological functions. It masks the ways in 
which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify 
hierarchical decision-making structures” (Young 128). I believe that, at least in practice, the 
reasonable person is not a hypothetical person; rather, it is a person with standards matching 
those held by the dominant group, i.e. upper-middle class white men (who also make up the 
majority of law makers and judges). If the reasonable person standard reflects dominant 
perspectives, it seems inapt to use in the objective part of the two-pronged objective/subjective 
standard (described above) of workplace sexual harassment law, especially if men (the dominant 
group) and women (the subordinated group) do not always reach a consensus on what kinds of 
conduct amounts to harassment. In arguing for implementation of the reasonable woman 
standard in cases of workplace sexual harassment, Debra DeBruin alleges that:  
We cannot eliminate oppression if we continue to privilege the perspectives and 
standards of dominant groups over those of oppressed groups. Thus, given a choice 
between adopting a criterion of sexual harassment that privileges men’s perspective and 
one that privileges women’s justice requires that we privilege the perspective of women 
(114).  
 
Thus, the reasonable woman standard is an appealing solution because it offers an alternative to 
the genderless-person stance, which attempts to evaluate a gender-specific harm from a position 
that is divorced from gender—this seems impossible to do, or at least impossible to do in any 
manner that could benefit female workers. The reasonable woman standard accomplishes what 
the reasonable person standard does not: it provides context.  
 To conclude this section, I will describe what the reasonable woman looks like in the 
context of workplace sexual harassment, or put in another way, how the reasonable woman 
standard may be described to judges and juries. I believe that the reasonable woman stance that 
fact-finders should adopt in these cases should be a woman with a strong, but by no means 
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complete, understanding of knowledge regarding the realities, such as high rates of sexual 
harassment and the pressures often faced by women who confront their harassers, of women who 
choose to work outside the home. Even though Kathryn Abrams ultimately rejects the reasonable 
woman standard, she makes an assertion that is helpful to my position concerning the 
characterization of a reasonable person in sexual harassment cases. Abrams alleges that the 
reasonable person should have adequate “political knowledge regarding sexual harassment”; she 
adds, “Such knowledge includes understanding the ways in which sexism has operated on 
women in the workplace and elsewhere…The account of sex based struggle in the workplace and 
of sexual harassment as a means of male control and masculine normative entrenchment 
encapsulates many of the understandings that this reasonable person should have” (Abrams 
1224).  
I also believe that the reasonable woman is someone with knowledge of how sexuality is 
often tied to her economic standing, which is something that may result in harassment committed 
by male peers or bosses. Knowledge of how women’s sexuality has been historically tied to her 
economic status to oppress women as a group may reasonably cause women to be threatened or 
intimidated by behavior that their male counterparts may not believe to be legally actionable; 
fact-finders must take this into account when applying the reasonable woman standard. DeBruin 
argues that even though the reasonable woman standard forces us to admit that men and women 
may not always be equally protected from identical behaviors, it is not establishing special, or 
higher protection for women; rather the reasonable standard simply reacts to women’s needs 
(116). Thus, a contextual approach, which asks fact-finders to consider the history of women’s 
oppression as continuing to shape the present, assists women plaintiffs by undercutting the belief 
that occurrences of sexual harassment are random acts of violence.  
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Further, the reasonable woman has knowledge of the paradox that operates within the 
workplace and society at large; women are viewed as inherently sexual bodies, while 
simultaneously shamed for their sexuality, resulting in them being labeled as impure. This 
paradox is one of the realities that makes the patriarchy so pervasive and makes it difficult for 
women as a group to advance in the workplace. Female workers often must prove their value as 
workers, in a manner that men do not have to. Also, this paradox results in stereotypes such as 
the belief that the harassed woman was “asking for it,” so the harasser cannot be at fault. 
Because of these powerful stereotypes, and the risks that accompany them (such as those 
affecting a woman’s job status), the reasonable woman may not be someone who reports 
harassment immediately after it happens, and importantly, waiting to report does necessarily not 
make her any less credible. Fact-finders who adopt the reasonable woman should step into the 
shoes of the victim (plaintiff). Although those applying this standard obviously cannot acquire a 
perfect understanding of how the victim perceived the conduct in question, i.e., the problem of 
other minds, they can do their best by examining the facts and the victim’s story, and then use 
the facts of the case to determine the reaction said facts would have produced in a reasonable 
woman. 
The reasonable woman standard should allow for some variance through consideration of 
diverse accounts of sexual harassment; it cannot assume that all women react in identical ways. 
Relevant factors such as race, socioeconomic status of the victim and harasser, the victim’s 
relation to the harasser (boss or coworker), ethnicity, severity and frequency of conduct, and the 
general workplace environment may influence fact-finders’ conclusions about what conduct a 
reasonable woman would view as harassment. For example, racism and sexism are often 
intertwined, so forms of harassment that are both racist and sexist, such as coworkers who 
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constantly make degrading comments about a woman’s race and sexuality, could negatively 
affect an African American woman much more than they would affect a white woman. Jane 
Dolkart claims that the analysis of the workplace environment is important, and that “whether 
the employer maintains a sexually segregated environment or a sexualized workplace culture, 
and whether the victim is in a traditionally female job or is a token in a traditionally male 
occupation” should be taken into consideration (24). For instance, a woman in a traditionally 
male occupation might be the victim of threats that send the message that she has overstepped 
her boundaries, and therefore, must leave this traditionally male-dominated sphere.  However, 
the reasonable woman standard should not be implemented in a relativistic manner, which would 
allow for determinations that any conduct be perceived as “intimidating, hostile, or abusive.” 
Instead, fact-finders must carefully analyze each legal issue considering relevant factors, such as 
patterns detailing how harassment often operates differently for men and women in the 
workplace—an example being that since women often occupy less powerful positions, they are 
more likely to prolong the filing of reports of harassment due to the possibility of retaliation. 
That said, if a woman reports minor accounts of harassment 40 years later and cannot 
demonstrate sensible reasons for not coming forward earlier, she may not be entitled to 
compensation she would have been likely to receive originally, if any. The reasonable woman 
standard has some objectivity built into it, through limits of what may be considered reasonable, 
and it therefore upholds our legal system’s emphasis on reasonableness as a guiding principle for 
fact-finders.  
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IV.  
The Reasonable Woman in Non-Confrontational Acts of Self-Defense: What would she look like? 
 I will begin this section by discussing State v. Norman, a case that directly relates to the 
issues surrounding acts of self-defense committed by abused women in non-confrontational 
settings. I believe that an illustration and analysis of Norman is helpful in terms of supporting my 
main contention that a reasonable woman standard should be used when warranted by sufficient 
evidence. Ideally, the Norman case will show that some women who act in self-defense should 
not be found guilty of the various crimes they may have been charged with, and thus, that some 
of these women should have the chance of being acquitted through claims of self-defense. 
Without a gender-specific standard of reasonableness that accounts for the differences 
surrounding women’s violent acts, it seems even more unlikely that courts will allow juries to 
hear defendants’ self-defense claims, since, as argued earlier, reasonableness is entrenched with 
male biases. Historically speaking, the notion of self-defense was built on assumptions that the 
only way self-defense could be labeled as reasonable is in situations that are pertinent to men’s 
lives—for example, as an acceptable response to an intruder entering a man’s home (Teays 68). 
The Norman case also highlights how the traditional understanding of self-defense can be 
problematic for women, as its use often leads to unjust outcomes.  
 The facts of the Norman case are as follows. Judy Norman, after being victimized and 
abused, physically and mentally, by her husband, John Norman, for more than twenty years, shot 
him in the back of his head while he was asleep (Shad 1160). During the trial court proceedings, 
Ms. Norman testified that the beatings she experienced at the hands of her husband had 
intensified during the 36 hours leading up to the killing; during this time, she sought assistance 
from several sources and attempted suicide (Shad 1161). After Mr. Norman fell asleep, Ms. 
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Norman went to her mother’s house to get a gun, which she used to kill her husband once she 
returned home (Shad 1161). Citing the Norman facts, Kerry Shad states that, among other forms 
of maltreatment, which were fueled by alcoholism and began five years into their relationship, 
“Mr. Norman regularly assaulted her, punching, kicking, slapping, and striking her with objects 
such as beer bottles and glasses. [Ms. Norman] also described having cigarettes extinguished 
against her skin, hot coffee poured on her, and glass and food crushed against her face” (1160). 
Richard Rosen also describes significant facts from the Norman case, “When she ran away, he 
tracked her, caught her, and beat her. He frequently threatened to kill her” (393). In fact, he 
threatened to kill her on the same day she used lethal force to protect her life (Rosen 393). The 
jury found Ms. Norman guilty and convicted her of voluntary manslaughter, resulting in a six-
year prison sentence after “The trial court refused to submit the issue of self-defense to the 
jury…ruling that the victim's passivity at the time of the killing barred Mrs. Norman from 
asserting self-defense as a justification or as an excuse” (Shad 1161). I believe that our intuition 
leads us to the conclusion that the Norman outcome represents a miscarriage of justice, as Ms. 
Norman should not have been found guilty.  
As I argued above, taking a more subjective stance to evaluate situations such as the 
Norman case is preferable, as it is the only way for these women to have an equal opportunity at 
presenting their defenses to crimes they have been charged with. Also, I believe the objective-
subjective distinction is more accurately described as a continuum, rather than a clear-cut 
boundary separating the two. Even if the allegedly objective stance is applied by fact-finders, is 
pure objectivity possible? As fact-finders are only human, they are not capable of making a truly 
objective decision. When drawing conclusions about the reasonableness of a defendant’s 
behavior, fact-finder’s worldviews and biases certainly come into play, despite instructions given 
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by the judge and their efforts to evaluate the case from a neutral position. Therefore, there is a 
parallel to the argument I defended concerning sexual harassment law: because neutrality is 
impossible, evaluating actions from the standpoint of those who are much more likely to be 
victims of gender-violence, or women, and thus attempting to understand how gender-violence 
shapes women’s lives and possibilities, appears to be a good alternative.  
 I suggest changing the reasonable person standard, which evaluates conduct through the 
stance of “the mind of a person of ordinary firmness” (Shad 1172) to the reasonable abused-
woman standard, which asks what could be reasonably expected from the mind of a hypothetical 
abused woman, and if her beliefs are found to be reasonable, whether they excuse her violent 
acts of self-defense? The reasonable abused-woman standard should only apply in cases where 
there is sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant is a victim of IPV, which can be classified 
as severe enough to have affected her psychological well-being. Some may object and claim that 
the standard I propose is purely subjective, and thus that any woman who kills an abusive spouse 
may be acquitted by means of my reformulation of the reasonableness standard, but I do not 
believe that this is a well-founded worry. Not all acts of violence by abused women will even be 
sufficient to allow the judge to present the issue of self-defense to the jury, let alone to acquit 
them through the assistance of a reasonableness standard that accounts for their realities. There is 
some objectivity built into the standard I am proposing. The jury or judge must evaluate 
reasonableness based on a careful examination of the facts of the case. For example, it would be 
unlikely that a case involving a woman who had been struck by her husband once, several years 
before she used deadly force against him, would warrant the use of the reasonable abused-
woman standard or an evaluation of whether self-defense is to be excused. Thus, the reasonable 
abused-woman standard provides victims of IPV with more equal access to our legal system, but 
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it does not abandon our fundamental belief that human life should be protected by the law unless 
there are strong reasons to think otherwise.  
 As noted in Part I, self-defense entails three core principles: necessity, proportionality, 
and fault. If we want to include abused women who attack their abusers in non-confrontational 
settings in traditional self-defense, it is necessary to loosen the core principles enough to allow 
for these women’s self-defense claims to potentially be successful. When the principles are 
understood too narrowly, as was the case in Norman, abused women have little to no chance of 
being excused from their acts. When understood in an extremely limited way, the principles 
reflect male standards and beliefs, such as the belief that self-defense is only acceptable when a 
man fights off an attacker or protects his wife, children, and home from an intruder (Teays 67). 
Loosening the core principles involves acknowledging that even the best definitions of them are 
not completely objective, fixed aspects of reality. As argued by Wanda Teays, “the concepts of 
imminent, immediate, and reasonable have much to do with how our values shape our use of 
language. Courts seem reluctant to acknowledge this, often treating concepts as if they were 
abstract entities outside of space and time” (70). If fact-finders are instructed to extend the time 
frame and to contextualize the defendant’s acts of violence, these concepts may be interpreted in 
a slightly different manner, which I will expand upon in the next several paragraphs. However, it 
is also important that the reasonable abused-woman standard does not cause us to depart from 
these core principles to such an extent that the principles, and our criminal justice system’s goal 
of protecting individual lives, are abandoned. I contend that it is possible to use a reasonable 
abused-woman standard while upholding the core principles of self-defense.  
At first glance, necessity seems pose the greatest issue for abused women who act in self-
defense, as necessity is often interpreted as requiring that the threat the woman is responding to 
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be imminent. However, necessity need not be understood so narrowly, especially if one is willing 
to look beyond the one-time attack model as the only situation that could possibly warrant the 
use of violence to protect a victim’s life. If one is insistent upon the belief that necessity entails 
imminency, we may reasonably consider a woman’s acts of violence in a non-confrontation as a 
response to imminent harm to her life. Teays argues that several factors must affect how the legal 
system should rethink imminence in these cases:  
All of the following are relevant: the woman has endured a history of battering, with a 
pattern of escalating violence, and has sought to remedy the situation by calling the 
police or, when possible without a greater threat to her life or those close to her, 
attempted to get help from others, or pursued resources in the community. Since we are 
not dealing with a one-time attack or combat, a reasonable woman has to weigh her 
options in light of the threat (74). 
 
Thus, considering these factors that assist in a contextualization of the woman’s actions, what 
may be considered a reasonable violent response to harm by an abused woman can differ from 
what could be reasonably expected of an ordinary person. Imminence can be understood in a 
broader, yet still sensible, manner if it is granted that the woman, as a victim of long-term abuse, 
has insight into the kinds of behavior that indicate an impending violent attack. Abused women 
are familiar with the nature of their abuser’s verbal threats. Therefore, they often have a keen 
ability to predict, with much accuracy, whether his threats will be acted upon; “The threat of 
serious violence is itself an assault and expression of hostility; from the time such a threat is 
made (and remains operative, not having been withdrawn), the woman is under attack. The 
imminence requirement is fulfilled” (Dimock 169). Provided that the abused woman has been 
beaten near to her death before, the law should not require her to wait for another brutal physical 
assault, that she has little chance of winning (should she choose to act in self-defense once the 
violence begins), to defend herself. To refuse to acknowledge that the woman has knowledge of 
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her abuser’s threats and the consequences of his threats is to undermine her experiences and 
struggles as a victim of IPV, and to imply that she could never be reasonable in her beliefs and 
about the harm posed by her abuser. Even if the attack doesn’t happen, it can still be said that, 
considering the circumstances, the woman’s belief was a reasonable one, and thus that her 
violent acts, although not justified, may be excused. 
 There is another route to conceptualizing the necessity principle. After examining the 
history of self-defense, Richard Rosen takes a more radical approach to the necessity principle 
through an argument in which he asserts that imminence should not be necessary for a self-
defense claim.5 Rosen argues that the judge should instruct the jury that imminence is a 
necessary component of the necessity principle of self-defense unless the defendant offers a 
sufficient amount of proof supporting her claim that she reasonably believed her attack was 
necessary even though the danger was not immediately present (405). According to Rosen, “If 
the defendant meets this burden of production, the jury will be instructed solely on necessity” 
(405). This reformulation of necessity would certainly benefit women who assert self-defense in 
the context examined by this thesis.  
However, one may object that it is unfair to allow certain women, even those who have 
been harmed by severe injustices, to present self-defense claims to a jury in absence of proving 
the complete necessity of her violent actions, as is indicated by imminency. Those who object in 
this manner might claim that allowing fact-finders to be instructed solely on necessity and not 
imminency is unfair because others who act in self-defense do not have this option. Richard 
Rosen argues that the law does not require absolute necessity before acquitting defendants due to 
self-defense (396). As stated by Rosen, “The difficulty with such an argument is that it is based 
                                                          
5 Rosen means that imminence matters in evaluating self-defense claims; however, imminence can be superseded 
if other factors are present.   
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on an erroneous premise-that the law always requires absolute necessity before granting the 
privilege of self-defense…The possibility always exists that a person attacking another with a 
gun will change his mind, or miss, or have a heart attack before pulling the trigger” (396). If we 
are comfortable granting that someone could be acquitted by means of self-defense in an event 
where he uses fatal force to defend himself under the reasonable belief that his attacker has a 
loaded gun, which is, in fact, unloaded, we should also allow women’s claims of self-defense in 
non-confrontational settings to be seriously considered to be consistent. In both circumstances, 
absolute necessity should not be a prerequisite for acting in self-defense when the defendant’s 
belief is reasonable. 
 Next, I will address the proportionality principle of self-defense, which can also be 
broadened to align with the experiences of abused women who act in self-defense. As stated, 
proportionality requires that the defensive force be comparable to the force used by the attacker 
(Rosen 379). In situations like Norman, where a woman has been severely assaulted for years, 
the fact that she is still alive years later is a matter of chance. In fact, in many occurrences 
women are killed by their abusers; estimates suggest that each year around 42% of women who 
are killed are murdered by their partners (Teays 57). For example, it is likely that Ms. Norman 
could have been killed by Mr. Norman if she had not shot him, considering his threat to kill her 
when he woke up and the severity of abuse that she regularly suffered at his hands. Further, 
Teays notes that these women “often endure a catch-22 situation: they can live with violence or 
they can attempt to leave and, potentially at least, face even greater violence or death…The 
greatest danger battered women face is when they attempt to separate from their abuser” (Teays 
58). In my opinion, these facts prompt a consideration of proportionality in a broader sense, in 
which, for example, the amount of time that fact-finders may consider should extend beyond the 
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moment of her self-defense. Whereas I think it would be unjust and in violation of the core tenets 
of self-defense to allow these women to act violently out of revenge, I believe that when there is 
sufficient evidence, the passivity of victim should not automatically preclude assertions of self-
defense from being heard by juries (as was the case in Norman). A proportional response to 
violence is often different for abused women than what it would be for people who have not been 
abused. Even though her response may not be considered proportional in the precise moment that 
she inflicts harm, an understanding of the history of the abusive relationship may allow fact-
finders to reach the conclusion that the harm she inflicted was proportional to the overall harm 
inflicted upon her by her abuser. Further, when abused women act in self-defense in non-
confrontational settings, there is also no guarantee that the harm they inflict will kill their abuser, 
which makes their responses proportionate to the violence that has been inflicted upon them by 
their partners—both situations result in outcomes that come down to chance.  
Finally, I will consider how the fault element can be understood in the context of self-
defense by abused women. As the fault principle demands that the individual claiming self-
defense cannot be the aggressor in the altercation under legal scrutiny (Rosen 379), it also poses 
issues for the type of self-defense claims examined in this thesis. A woman’s self-defense claim 
automatically fails if the jury determines who the aggressor is based on an examination of the 
moment in time in which the woman acts in self-defense—that is, her decision to act in a non-
confrontational setting. However, in cases involving victims of domestic abuse who act in self-
defense, the distinction between aggressor and victim is not as evident as it is in cases of more 
traditional examples of self-defense. While it is not necessary to claim that the abuser’s life is 
less valuable than the IPV victim’s life, it is helpful to examine who bears the burden of risks 
that accompany any violent situation. Richard Rosen argues that, “Ultimately, a judgment on the 
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appropriateness of self-defense is a determination of who must bear the risks attendant upon a 
violent situation…it is the person who creates the violent situation, and who escalates it to a life-
threatening level, who should bear that risk” (410). In my opinion, the abusive partner is the 
person who has created the conflict, escalated the violence, and should therefore bear the burden 
of risk if his victim does strike back. It seems very unlikely that many women without the 
experiences of extreme abuse would be driven to a state where they believe that self-help in the 
form of violence is a viable option, and often, the only way for them to protect their lives. As 
stated by Susan Dimock, “The batterer is not ‘innocent;’ he has issued credible threats of 
violence to kill or seriously harm the woman he batters. His behavior is immoral and unlawful” 
(168). And, if a defendant does not offer sufficient evidence demonstrating that her partner has 
created and escalated the violence, she would not satisfy the fault principle. Similarly, to the 
other two self-defense principles discussed in this thesis, fault can be reconceived in a manner 
that makes self-defense law more conducive to IPV victims who attack their abusers, but that 
does not abandon the meaning attributed to the fault principle.  
 I will conclude this section by laying out what the reasonable abused-woman standard 
looks like in the context of victims of domestic violence who attack, and, or kill their abusers, 
and what can be expected from women in this position. Like the reasonable woman standard 
described in the section on sexual harassment law, she is someone with an adequate level of 
political knowledge of the historical context of IPV and how the history affects the system today. 
As, Wanda Teays notes, quoting Martha Minow, “the result of a policy of ‘nonintervention’ by 
the state bolstered the authority of the man; thus, the battered woman has had limited options. 
Not until the 1970s and 1980s did courts and legislatures change the view that family disputes 
were off limits for the state” (59). The state remains reluctant to intervene with gendered 
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violence occurring in the home. For example, police are unlikely to make arrests when 
responding to domestic violence calls and around 70% of women are turned away from women’s 
shelters that are at full capacity (Teays 59). Also, the vast majority of women who kill only do so 
after seeking out other solutions, such as calling the police, asking friends, or reaching out to 
organizations (Rosen 404). Therefore, it does not seem like these women view attacking their 
abusers as the first response, rather it can be understood as a last resort.  
These facts highlight our society’s traditionally accepted belief that the home is a realm 
of free, private individuals acting; however, this realm of privacy has also facilitated male 
control through the state’s willingness to turn a blind eye to domestic violence, which implies 
that women are to be subservient to their partners. The reasonable abused-woman standard 
acknowledges how the history of the state’s relationship to IPV has profound implications for 
today, which helps explain why many of these women reasonably feel as if there are not many 
viable options for escaping their abusers.  
The implementation of a reasonable abused-woman standard should involve the use of 
expert testimony to help fact-finders understand that what warrants a reasonable defensive 
response by an abused woman may be different than what would warrant a reasonable defensive 
response by an ordinary person. Expert testimony is admitted if it will “draw inferences from the 
facts which a jury would not be competent to draw” (Crocker 137). Since there are many 
misconceptions and stereotypes about women who are in abusive relationships, such as the belief 
that she remains in the relationship because she likes the violence, or that if she wanted to leave, 
she would have once the abuse started, expert testimony citing psychological and sociological 
findings can help undermine these stereotypes. Analysis of cultural expectations can also be 
useful for fact-finders; as described by Crocker: 
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A battered woman who does not leave her husband, seek help, or fight back is behaving 
according to societal expectations. The cultural perception of marriage as a lifelong bond 
and commitment instructs a woman to stay and work to improve-not abandon-the 
marriage. By explaining why battered women stay, why they do not call for help, and 
why they do not fight back, and by relating these facts specifically to the defendant, 
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome allows the jury to judge the defendant on 
all the facts of the case and more accurately determine her claim of self-defense. (135) 
 
An expert’s analysis of these cultural values, such as the belief that a wife should never leave her 
husband, helps fact-finders understand that societal expectations play a role in men and women 
acting violently in different situations. Further, expert testimony is crucial if juries are to 
understand what characteristics are relevant to understanding a reasonable abused-woman’s 
defensive actions, and whether these defensive actions stem from a reasonable fear of harm. For 
instance, women are socialized to be weak and passive; and this coupled with abused women’s 
knowledge of what gestures or conduct, that may be meaningless to others, indicate an imminent 
attack by their abusers, may create a rational fear of danger in abused women that makes their 
use of force excusable (Crocker 127). The reasonable abused-woman standard cannot assume 
that all women respond in an identical manner to abusive situations, as individual responses are 
largely shaped by knowledge of the details of the women’s relationship with their abusive 
partners.  
However, the standard does consider women’s subordinate status in our society, which is 
one major commonality experienced by all IPV victims who act in self-defense, and one of the 
primary reasons that justice requires the use of such a gender-specific standard in self-defense 
law. Even though the reasonable abused-woman standard is much more subjective than the 
reasonable person standard, it does not follow that there cannot be some objectivity built into it. 
There are discernable patterns, many of which I discussed above relating to abused women’s acts 
of self-defense that can be used to determine whether a defensive response in the form of an 
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attack or killing is reasonable. These patterns, such as strong abilities to predict assaults, or the 
failure of the police and other parties to assist women, can be applied to the facts of cases to 
determine if a defendant should be excused for the harm she inflicted on her abuser. Finally, a 
reasonable abused-woman standard is necessary because of the societal norms concerning 
women who act violently; these norms are reflected in our legal system. As argued by Teays, 
“Anger or violence in a man wronged by his wife is often explained away as pride, protection, or 
healthy possessiveness. But the woman who is angry or violent elicits pity, irritation, or fear 
rather than sympathy” (Teays 69). These biases affect the implementation of our laws; for 
instance, women who kill their husbands are likely to get longer prison sentences than men who 
kill their wives (Teays 69). Justice demands that we use a reasonable abused-woman standard to 
challenge the belief that a woman who acts in violence is automatically unreasonable through her 
transgression of gender roles, and to give abused women a fair shot of being acquitted by means 
of self-defense claims. 
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V. 
Objections and Responses  
 The first major objection to the reasonable woman and reasonable abused women 
standards goes as follows: it will be too confusing for male legal officials, the majority of which 
are male, to use a standard that is based on the experiences and perceptions of women. Because 
men have not directly experienced the gender inequality in our society that women live through 
every day, they cannot understand how to apply the reasonable woman standard, which results in 
men either applying their own male biases to the reasonable woman standards or interpreting the 
standards in a manner that reflects negative stereotypes about women—such as the belief that 
women need special protection because they are weak. Therefore, our legal system should not 
use gender-specific standards. 
To adopt this objection is to hold an extremely limited view of men and humanity. Even 
though men and women do not experience gender inequality in the same way, men can adopt 
reasonableness standards that align with women’s lives, especially when men are willing to listen 
to and sympathize with women’s first-hand encounters of gender oppression in the workplace 
and home. One of Iris Young’s core claims is that, “it does not follow from the particularity of 
their histories and interests that people are only self-regarding, unable and unwilling to consider 
other interests and points of view” (134). Our human nature gives us the potential to listen to and 
understand diverse viewpoints. Further, MacKinnon’s concept of “consciousness raising” also 
supports the implementation of the reasonable woman standard in the two areas argued for in this 
thesis because it can be used to foster men’s understanding of women’s realities—whether that 
be in offensive workplace environments, or in situations of horrible abuse that may make it more 
likely that abused women will resort to violence in non-traditional ways. The possibility of 
“consciousness raising” among men is especially important for the two areas being discussed in 
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this thesis, as most judges are men—around 65% to 70% of U.S. state court judges (Statistics: 
U.S. State Court Women Judges 2016). If the reasonable woman standard is put into use in the 
two areas discussed in my thesis, male fact-finders will ideally apply it in a manner that does not 
harm women further. Finally, men will only have to adopt gender-specific standards of 
reasonableness as long as women remain in an unequal position to men. Once equality between 
men and women is achieved, this standard will no longer be necessary, as, for example, the 
gendered gap between perceptions of sexual harassment noted by Shoenfelt et al. (649) will be 
closed, at least partially due to the reasonable (abused) woman standard. The standard I propose 
has the potential to heighten men’s awareness of what conduct may be considered harassment, or 
of why abused women may reasonably use defensive force against their attackers in non-
confrontational settings.  
 The second objection holds that the adoption of reasonable woman standards will make it 
impossible to strike a balance between restricting women by running into the same problems 
relating to the reasonable person standard, i.e. in practice the reasonable woman standard will 
reflect the perceptions and beliefs of white, upper-middle class women, thereby marginalizing 
women who are members of racial minorities or low socioeconomic statuses, and being so 
subjective that they leave out all objectivity. The latter concern is problematic because the 
functioning of our legal system depends on us having adequate guidance to evaluate conduct. 
 Balancing these two concerns is admittedly a difficult task, but the potential benefits 
outweigh the costs. The benefits to women that would result from a correctly formulated 
reasonable woman or reasonable abused-woman standard are immense; these standards would 
open up previously closed off space for women in our legal system, and they have the potential 
to create a legal environment that is more conducive to gender equality, which is a benefit for 
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everyone, as aspirations of gender equality in the legal realm uphold our system’s core belief that 
everyone should be equal under the law. Naomi Cahn has a powerful insight: “Understanding its 
dangers of essentialization, marginalization, and potential disempowerment, we can nonetheless 
embrace the standard when it does account for women's lives and reject it in all other situations” 
(Cahn 1430). The reasonable woman standards must account for the fact that not all women are 
the same with identical experiences, but that this does not mean that there are no limits to what 
behavior or reactions to conduct may be considered reasonable. For example, fact-finders will 
not hold that any situation a plaintiff perceives as harassment is rightly workplace sexual 
harassment. If a woman perceives several glances from her male coworker as harassment, fact-
finders may, even after considering that women often respond to conduct differently than men, 
hold that her reaction is not objectively reasonable, and thus, that she is not entitled to damages. 
Each situation of workplace sexual harassment and self-defense must be carefully examined, and 
a contextual consideration of the circumstances in question will help fact-finders determine what 
is reasonable from a viewpoint that is not entirely subjective.  
 Finally, one may object by asserting that gender-specific standards fail because even 
when fact-finders are instructed to use them when evaluating cases, the gender-specific standards 
make little, if any, positive difference in terms of outcomes. For instance, Nicole Newman’s 
research on the outcomes of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment demonstrates 
that use of the reasonable woman standard does not lead to “significantly higher hostile work 
environment success rates than a strict use of the reasonable person standard, or even no 
reasonableness at all” (554). Newman concludes that the reasonable woman standard is not an 
effective solution to dealing with workplace sexual harassment, as it does not increase the rate 
that sexual harassment victims are able to prove the existence of an objectively hostile, abusive, 
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or intimidating workplace environment (554). Proponents of this objection may argue that 
reasonableness standards come down to semantics and thus do not have the potential to 
effectuate change in the law.  
 Findings indicating that reasonable woman standards do not make a difference in legal 
outcomes in terms of women having a greater chance to win workplace sexual harassment cases 
do not prove that they are the wrong answer. Practical consequences that could very well be the 
result of human error should be kept distinct from the theoretical justifications for reasonable 
woman standards. Perhaps the reasonable woman standard has not been correctly implemented 
by the courts. There is a possibility that the courts are not taking the diversity of women’s voices 
into account, or that, in practice, the courts are not departing enough from the reasonable person 
standard. I suggest that there should be a general consensus among the courts on the definitions 
of the reasonable woman and the reasonable abused-woman standard, so that judges are able to 
instruct fact-finders on what these standards entail in a clear, straight-forward manner. Also, 
there could be other explanatory factors at work here that were not correctly isolated in 
Newman’s study. Ultimately, though, more research is needed to identify what other factors may 
be affecting the outcomes in cases that use gender-specific reasonableness standards. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, I believe that because gender plays a major role in shaping people’s lives, 
experiences, and opportunities, justice demands the use of a reasonable woman standard in 
sexual harassment law and the use of a reasonable abused-woman standard in self-defense law 
dealing with non-confrontational settings. The inclusion of these principles in our legal system 
will provide women with a chance to express their voices and experiences in our legal system, an 
area in which women as a group have largely been disadvantaged. Implementation of these 
standards would ideally heighten our legal system and society’s awareness of the causes and 
effects of gender inequality in our society, which would encourage individuals to confront 
sexism in our legal system and beyond. Once equality for all is realized, reasonable woman 
standards will no longer be necessary.  
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